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SESSION 9
EMERGING POLICY AND PRACTICE ISSUES
Steven L. Schooner
Nash & Cibinic Professor of Government Procurement Law
The George Washington University Law School
David J. Berteau
Director of the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Washington D.C.

I.

THE POST-MILLENIUM PROCUREMENT SPENDING BINGE IS OVER: WILL PROCUREMENT SPENDING PLATEAU OR DECLINE?

A. The New Economic Reality (Finally). Procurement spending decreased, significantly, last
year.
B. Below $500 Billion: The Decrease in Federal Procurement Spending is a Landmark
Event. Regular attendees of this conference are familiar with this chapter’s coverage of the postmillennium federal procurement spending trend. Last year’s decrease marks the end of an era. The
post-millennial binge is significant not only for its longevity but for its size. Keep in mind that, in
Fiscal Year 2001, federal procurement spending rose to just over $223 billion. The following years,
in 2002 and 2003, we witnessed 18 and 20 percent spending increases. After steady increases in the
middle of the decade, we reached an unprecedented plateau, where federal procurement spending
stabilized at just over $540 billion for four fiscal years, from 2008 through 2011. We now know that,
in 2009, we experienced the first decrease in federal procurement spending for well over a decade (but
it took a number of years for the data to catch up). Then, in 2013, it appears we finally experienced
the first dramatic decline in spending and a plunge below the (oh-so-dramatic) $500 billion threshold
that the government exceeded from 2008 through 2012.
Using adjusted figures (yes, between the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) and USASpending.gov, history is consistently being re-written), it appears that the annual increases in federal
procurement were most dramatic from 2001 through 2008, typically running at more than three times
the rate of inflation. The experts correctly predicted that the growth rate eventually would taper; in
2009, the rate slowed and, apparently, growth finally stalled. Yet, in retrospect, the dire warnings
that the current spending binge was a blip – and that procurement spending would promptly retract
– unfolded far more slowly than anyone expected. Indeed, the recently adjusted numbers paint a
picture of extraordinary spending consistency – from 2008 through 2011 – that appears as quirky
as it is accidental.
The chart below summarizes the empirical evidence that the procurement spending growth
cycle finally has run its course. The $500+ billion plateau represented the high end of a robust and
sustained growth curve. Now, time will tell how far the reductions will go and whether they can be
sustained. It will be fascinating to see how long it takes until the government again crosses the $500
billion threshold.
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Federal Procurement Spending 2001-2013*
Fiscal
Year

Procurement
Spending (in Billions
of Dollars)

Percentage Increase
or (Decrease†) From
Previous Year

Percentage Increase in
Consumer Price Index
(CPI)

2013

$463.4*

(12)

1.7

2012

$520.9

(4)

3.0

2011

$541.5

0

1.5

2010

$541.5

0

2.7

2009

$541.0

0

0.1

2008

$542.1

14

4.1

2007

$469.5

10

2.5

2006

$432.0

10

3.4

2005

$392.1

13

3.3

2004

$346.3

9

1.9

2003

$318.1

21

2.4

2002

$263.4

18

1.6

2001

$223.1

*FY 2013 figures reflect only an estimate based upon preliminary reporting.
† Parentheticals reflect negative numbers.
See www.USASpending.gov. Annual increases in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban
Consumers (CPI-U) were extracted from the annual Detailed Report Tables and the Table
Containing History of CPI-U U.S. All Items Indexes and Annual Percent Changes From 1913
to Present, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, available at
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/#tables.

C. A Band Aid Is Better Than Chaos. The (dominant, inescapable)
emerging issue, looking ahead, is that the government spent less money
last year and, most likely, will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.
Unfortunately, throughout 2013, far too much attention was consumed
by political brinksmanship, budgetary chicanery, teetering on the edge
of the so-called fiscal cliff, and sequestration threats, preparations, and
aftermath. See OMB Highlights Costs of Recent Federal Shutdown, 55 GC
¶ 368; GAO Reviews DOD’s Approach to Sequestration Spending Cuts, 55
GC ¶ 367; Military Brass Warn of Sequestration’s Impact on Readiness, 55
GC ¶ 365; CR Funding, Sequestration Threaten DOD Multiyear Procurements, 55 GC ¶ 356; CR Funding and Sequestration Threaten Military
Acquisition, Panel Warns, 55 GC ¶ 338; DOD Coping With Continuing
FY 2014 Budget Impasse, 55 GC ¶ 320; Limited Options for Contractors,
Protestors if Federal Shutdown Continues, 55 GC ¶ 312; Military Leaders
Outline Risks of Continuing Sequestration, 55 GC ¶ 293; Sequestration and
Budget Cuts Severely Damaging Military Readiness, Hagel Tells Senate
Committee, 55 GC ¶ 225; OMB Reports Provide Early Look At FY 2014
Sequestration Cuts, 55 GC ¶ 128; DOD Witnesses Discuss Sequestration
Budget Cuts, 55 GC ¶ 75; President Issues Sequestration Order, 55 GC
¶ 65; Elizabeth Ferrel et al., Feature Comment: Looming Fiscal Crisis
Increases Pressure for Another Round of Base Closures, 55 GC ¶ 49; DOD
Prepares for Cuts, Leaders Want Permanent Sequestration Action, 55 GC
¶ 12; President Signs Fiscal Cliff Legislation, Postponing Sequestration,
55 GC ¶ 11.
© 2014 Thomson Reuters
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At least for now, there appears to be some amount of short-term budget
stability. No doubt, there is significantly less money to go around, but we’ll
take certainty (even short-term certainty) over chaos for the foreseeably
future.
D. The Chasm Between Contracts and Grants Begins to Shrink.
Plenty of contracting experts assert that, fundamentally, not much distinguishes a government contract from a federal grant. Despite all of the
attention focused upon (and burdensome oversight associated with) government contracting, grant spending continues to outpace procurement
spending. Consistent with the trend we’ve previously reported, grant
spending exceeded procurement spending last year, as it has for eleven of
the last thirteen years. We long expected that, eventually, the oversight and
regulatory community would shift its focus from procurement to grants.
And, if the government is serious about reducing its debts and its annual
deficits, such a shift in emphasis seemed unavoidable.
Federal Procurement and Grant Spending
2001-2013*
Fiscal
Year

Procurement Spending
(in Billions)

Grant Spending
(in Billions)

2013

463.4*

$524.3*

2012

$520.9

$539.5

2011

$541.5

$566.9

2010

$541.5

$614.3

2009

$541.0

$665.0

2008

$542.1

$419.7

2007

$469.5

$430.2

2006

$432.0

$490.0

2005

$392.1

$441.7

2004

$346.3

$450.1

2003

$318.1

$493.7

2002

$263.4

$406.3

2001

$223.1

$330.8

*FY 2013 figures reflect only an estimate based upon preliminary
reporting.

See Total Federal Spending, www.USASpending.gov.

This year, finally, the government announced a significant revamping
of the regulatory regime surrounding grants. See Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal
Awards, 78 Fed. Reg. 78590 (Dec. 26, 2013) (amending and replacing 2
C.F.R. Chapter I, and Chapter II, Parts 200, 215, 220, 225, and 230), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-12-26/pdf/2013-30465.
pdf. See also, the 35-minute webcast, Improving Outcomes by Reducing
Red Tape for Financial Assistance, available at https://cfo.gov/cofar/.
Weighing in at exactly 100 pages of (very) small print, this should provide
significant employment opportunities for attorneys, compliance special-
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ists, and grants experts. To the extent that the new guidance “eliminate[s]
numerous overlapping duplicative and conflicting provisions of guidance,”
we applaud OMB.
Readers may be somewhat disoriented, however, by the seemingly contradictory goals of the regulatory initiative. The final guidance explains,
on the one hand: “This reform … will improve the integrity of the financial
management and operation of Federal programs and strengthen accountability for Federal dollars by improving policies that protect against waste,
fraud, and abuse.” Simultaneously, however, the government anticipates
that “this reform will increase the impact and accessibility of programs
by minimizing time spent complying with unnecessarily burdensome
administrative requirements….” 78 Fed. Reg. 78590. The history of acquisition reform suggests that the government typically seeks either to
increase accountability or increase efficiency. For example, cynics may also
be intrigued to see the smooth transition, in the introductory passages,
from provisions that “allow Federal agencies some additional flexibility to
waive some requirements (… [and the] option to apply to OMB to waive
requirements) that impede their capacity to achieve better outcomes” to
touting that the “guidance will provide a backbone for sound financial
management[.]” We remain skeptical that this regulatory initiative will
simultaneously and seamlessly achieve both stated ends.
Consistent with DoD’s performance report (discussed below), it is
encouraging to see that OMB’s initiative “includes provisions that focus
on performance over compliance to provide accountability for Federal
funds.” OMB included “more robust guidance to Federal agencies to measure performance in a way that will help … improve program outcomes,
share lessons learned, and spread the adoption of promising practices
… [and] provide recipients with clear performance goals, indicators, and
milestones.”
Few stones appear unturned. The guidance addresses efficient use of
Information Technology (IT) and shared services. Cost issues – policies
on direct and indirect costs and other limitations on allowable costs – receive significant treatment. Acquisition experts who have experienced the
seamless implementation and improvements associated with the Central
Contractor Registry (CCR) will take comfort in learning that: “The final
guidance includes provisions that set the stage for Federal agencies to
manage Federal awards via standardized business process and use of
consistently defined data elements.” The private sector may not be quite
as convinced that “[t]his will reduce administrative burden on non-Federal
entities[.]” Social policies (such as family-friendly policies) find a place in
the regulatory regime as well. For example:
Provisions … provide flexibilities that better allow nonFederal entities to … allow their employees to balance their
personal responsibilities while maintaining successful careers
contributing to Federal awards…. These provisions allow
for policies that ease dependent care costs when attending
conferences [an issue which has, in the past, prevented] more
women from maintaining careers in science.
© 2014 Thomson Reuters
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Apparently, the scientific community’s conferences have not been tainted, stigmatized, and disparaged as part of the otherwise government-wide
Congressional crack-down on conferences and educational programming.
Nonetheless, of course, oversight, accountability, and compliance feature
prominently in the new regime.
The final guidance right-sizes the footprint of oversight and
Single Audit requirements to strengthen oversight and focus
audits where there is greatest risk of waste, fraud, and abuse of
taxpayer dollars. It improves transparency and accountability
by making single audit reports available to the public online,
and encourages Federal agencies to take a more cooperative
approach to audit resolution in order to more conclusively
resolve underlying weaknesses in internal controls.

See also Chapter 12 (of these materials), Federally Supported Research
& Development.
E. Correlating the Protest Trend? Consistent with the above-referenced plateau and reduction in federal procurement spending, it appears
that, as 2013 concludes, the recent growth trend in GAO bid protests appears to have stalled (well below the all-time high seen in the early 1990’s).
See Chapter Six (of these materials), Bid Protest Overview, and GAO Bid
Protest Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2013, GAO-14-276SP
(indicating that the number of new protests declined by two percent in
2013), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-276SP. It is
too early to tell if this is a blip in the trend line or a meaningful behavioral change. Also, based upon earlier research, we are not yet persuaded
that the protest rate directly corresponds to the spending trend. Readers
interested in these issues should also see the intriguing (and ongoing)
cost-benefit research on bid protests that looks beyond the statistics posted
annually by GAO. Daniel I. Gordon, Bid Protests: The Costs Are Real, but
the Benefits Outweigh Them, 42, Pub. Cont. L. J. 489 (2013).
II. A NEW YEAR: A NEW OFPP ADMINISTRATOR?
By the time the Year in Review Conference convenes, it appears that
Joe Jordan will have stepped down as Administrator for the Office of
Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP). OMB informally summarized his
tenure, noting that he was “a driving force behind administration procurement initiatives, including eliminating inefficiencies and buying smarter
through strategic sourcing and shared services; improving contractor accountability and fighting waste, fraud, and abuse through the increased
use of suspensions and debarments; stopping the excessive reimbursement for contractor executives; and making it easier for small businesses
to contract with the federal government.” Jason Miller, OFPP’s Jordan
leaving for the private sector, (Dec. 20, 2013) (citing OMB Director Sylvia
Burwell), available at http://www.federalnewsradio.com/517/3529122/
OFPPs-Jordan-leaving-for-the-private-sector.
Jordan “will be joining FedBid as President of Public Sector … [to]
help grow and manage FedBid’s Federal Buyer base, while driving additional growth in the State, Local and Education (SLED) sectors. Jordan
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will also assist with the company’s recent private sector launch, a move
to open commercial businesses of all sizes to buy commodity goods and
simple services in the online marketplace.” FedBid Press Release, FedBid
Announces Hire of White House Procurement Policy Chief Joseph Jordan,
(Dec. 20, 2013), available at http://finance.yahoo.com/news/fedbidannounces-hire-white-house-184600163.html. Apparently, Lesley Field,
the deputy administrator, will once again serve as acting administrator
for an indefinite period.
III. DEFENSE TRENDS
A. Change at the Top. Deputy Secretary of Defense Aston (Ash) B.
Carter, formerly USD (AT&L), announced he would step down at the end
of 2013. Many will remember Carter as the driving force behind the original Better Buying Power (BBP) initiative. See, e.g., http://bbp.dau.mil/.
His parting gift appears to be an interim revised DOD 5000 series document, with a mandate that a revised document be prepared in 180 days.
See http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/500002_interim.
pdf. USD(AT&L) Frank Kendall’s summary of the document explains
that it was intended to implement post-2008 statutes and regulations,
integrate certain BPP initiatives (such as “should cost analysis”) into
the document, reinforce the importance and primacy of the program
managers (PM’s) and the program executive officers (PEO’s), increase
readability, and make the document more helpful to relevant acquisition
professionals. USD(AT&L) Memorandum for the Acquisition Workforce,
The New Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02 (Dec. 02, 2013),
http://www.acq.osd.mil/docs/2013_12_03%20Signed%20Kendall%20
Distro%20Memo.pdf. See also, USD(AT&L) Memorandum, Implementation
Directive for Better Buying Power 2.0 - Achieving Greater Efficiency and
Productivity in Defense Spending (Apr. 24, 2013), http://image.exct.net/
lib/fefd167774640c/d/1/USD.ATL.BBP%202.0%20Implementation%20
Directive%2024%20Apr%2013.pdf.
We are heartened by the refinement of the message as BBP evolves.
USD(AT&L) Kendall appears to have fundamentally changed the tone of
BBP and, in so doing, increased the prospects for incremental improvement. Among other things, BBP 2.0 emphasized that:
• The first responsibility of the acquisition workforce is to
think.....
• [Q]ualified people are essential to successful outcomes[,] and
professionalism ... drives results more than any policy change.
• [A]cquisition fundamentals work.... [B]asics would include ...
effective incentives to industry[;] ... understanding and active
management of technical risk[;] ... demonstrated progress before
major commitments; ... and .. using the right contract type of the
job.

B. Information Is Power: Watching the Trends. While the government dutifully plugs data into its mandatory databases, such as FPDS,
we continue to be interested in analysis of more sophisticated data that
© 2014 Thomson Reuters
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provides better, more accessible insights into how the federal government’s procurement dollars are spent. A number of additional reports
and studies build upon data we have previously reported. See, e.g., David
J. Berteau, Gregory Sanders, Jesse Ellman & Rhys McCormick, U.S. Department of Defense Contract Spending and the Supporting Industrial
Base, 2000– 2012, A Report of the CSIS National Security Program on
Industry and Resources (December 2013), available at http://csis.org/
files/publication/131207_Sanders_DODContractSpending_Web.pdf.
Highlights include:
•

The overall DoD budget began to drop in 2011, but 2012 marked
the third year of decline for DoD service contract obligations
and the fourth year for all other contracts. This decline leaves
contract obligations at 55 percent of total DoD outlays, well
below the 62 percent share in 2000 and the 69 percent share
in 2008. Nonetheless, in 2012 constant dollar terms, the $361
billion spent on contracts in FY2012 exceeds the defense contract obligations from any year between 2000 and 2006.

•

The changes over recent years have not been evenly distributed.
-

The Army’s share of DoD contract obligations rose from
28 percent in 2000 to a peak of 40 percent in 2008, as Iraq
and Afghanistan drove spending priorities. With the draw
down, Army contract obligations declined at nearly three
times the overall DoD rate, leaving the Army with a 30
percent share in 2012.

-

The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and the category of
“Other DoD” components (which includes all contracting
entities within DoD that are not covered by the other four
component categories, such as the Missile Defense Agency
(MDA), TRICARE, and US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)) also rose and have retained a notably higher
share of contract obligations even during drawdown.

-

The Navy’s share of DoD obligations fell through 2005 and
stayed somewhat steady, although 2012 saw a sharp (11
percent) decline from 2011.

-

The Air Force share grew by 5 percent from 2011 to 2012,
after losing share over the previous 10 years.

•

Product purchasing rose from 46 percent in 2000 to a high of
51 percent in 2008, before falling back to 45 percent by 2010.

•

The share of defense contract obligations awarded for Services
hovered between 39 percent and 42 percent between 2000 and
2008, but rose to a high of 44 percent in 2010.
-

•

R&D, which accounted for a high of 15 percent of defense
contract obligations in 2002, has declined steadily since,
to a low of 10 percent in 2011 and 2012.

The share of defense contract obligations awarded without competition rose from 38 percent in 2000 to 42 percent in 2012. The
share of defense contract obligations awarded after competition
with two offers has declined steadily, from 25 percent in 2000 to
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14 percent in 2012, due in large part to an increase in the number
of competitive offers. Overall, the share of contract obligations
awarded after competition with three or more offers has risen from
25 percent in 2000 to 34 percent in 2012, with the vast majority
of that rise attributable to cases with five or more offers.
•

Between 2011 and 2012, contract obligations awarded without competition declined more slowly than overall defense (-2
percent), rising as a share of overall defense contract obligations from 41 percent to 42 percent. In that year, the share of
competed contract dollars awarded after a single offer declined
sharply (-22 percent), in line with current policy guidance, falling from 10 percent of contract obligations to 8 percent. Both
competition with two offers (-9 percent) and competition with
three or four offers (-14 percent) declined more rapidly than did
overall defense. Competition with five or more offers actually
saw growth (5 percent) even as overall defense declined, rising
as a share of overall defense from 19 percent to 21 percent.

•

The rise of indefinite delivery contracts coincided with a move
to larger contracts. The share of defense contract obligations
awarded in contracts of less than $1 million has gradually declined, from 20 percent in 2000 to 14 percent in 2012. The share
of obligations awarded for contracts between $1 million and
$25 million declined from 37 percent in 2000 to 31 percent in
2008, and fluctuated between 32 percent and 34 percent since
then. The share awarded for contracts between $25 million
and $500 million have fluctuated between 30 percent and 35
percent throughout the period. Contracts of $500 million and
greater grew from an 11 percent share in 2000 to a 22 percent
share of contract obligations by 2012, even seeing slight growth
(3 percent) in real terms from 2011 to 2012, despite declines in
overall DoD contract obligations.

•

When comparing the top 20 vendors in 2002 and 2012, there
has been a moderate broadening of the defense industrial base.
In 2002, the top 5 defense vendors accounted for 34 percent of
total defense contract obligations versus 27 percent in 2012.
Similarly, the top 20 accounted for 47 percent of total defense
contract obligations in 2002, compared to 43 percent in 2012.
-

The top 5 defense vendors remained unchanged between
2002 and 2012, although their order has shifted.

-

The most notable additions to the top 20 in 2012 were
the three fuel supply-related vendors: Royal Dutch Shell,
Supreme Group, and BP.

C. The Defense Department Considers Metrics. As much as
we are intrigued by this type of number-crunching, arguably, the most
thought-provoking reading of the year comes out of DoD’s performance,
outcome, or metrics initiative. Plenty of readers will be disappointed with
the often-vanilla presentation. But the report is frank, well organized,
clear (and surprisingly free of obfuscation), and chock-full of intriguing
observations and conclusions. Some highlights include:
© 2014 Thomson Reuters
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•

Analysis of historical Major Defense Acquisition Program
(MDAP) contracts revealed no statistical correlation between
the use of contract type (e.g., cost-plus and fixed-price types)
and lower cost or schedule growth. In other words, the type of
contract used in each case did not result in a statistically
significant difference in cost growth.

•

The Army has both the largest number of canceled programs
and the largest percentage of sunk RDT&E costs…. The majority of the Army’s sunk funding … was due to the cancellation
of the Future Combat System (FCS); however, every year from
1996 to 2010, the Army spent more than $1 billion annually on
programs that ultimately were canceled.

•

Undefinitized contract actions (UCAs) had a measurable increase on total contract cost growth and also on cycle time in
development.

•

The time required to acquire next-generation capabilities is
often longer than the strategic threat and technology cycles
these capabilities are meant to address.

•

Acquisition is about risk management—not certainties. ... [I]
t is important to remember that developing technologically
superior military capability is not a risk-free endeavor...

•

Intelligent acquisition is key.

•

Programs with bad starts often continue to have problems.

•

Performance relative to original baselines does not guarantee
lowest end cost to the taxpayers.

•

Performance across all MDAPs at the program level is highly
skewed, with a few outliers with extremely high cost growth,
a large population with moderate cost growth, and a small
number with negative or negligible cost growth.

•

Affordability will be a major challenge in the next few years.

AT&L Issues First Defense Acquisition System Performance Report, 55
GC ¶ 214, available at http://bbp.dau.mil/doc/Report_on_the_Performance_of_the_Def_Acq_System.pdf.
It is very early in the process, and it is difficult to anticipate the depth
of DoD’s commitment to this initiative. But we applaud DoD’s effort to
evolve past a fascination with our longstanding, generally unhelpful,
and popular-primarily-because-they’re-easy-to-measure metrics (price,
schedule, performance specifications) associated with the award – rather
than the outcome – of the contract. Specifically, increased attention to
quantifying value for money spent and customer satisfaction obtained
would be a step in the right direction.
D. Difficult Times Require Critical Thinking. We applaud BAE’s
CEO, Linda Hudson, for organizing and giving voice to at least some of the
private sector’s anxiety about its business partner. Among other things,
she articulated that:
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[L]ike others doing business with the Government, we have
been blown by budget winds into three fiscal cliffs in barely
more than a year and a half....
[There] is a howling gale of contradictions between the nation’s
long-term fiscal direction and the realities of an increasingly
unstable and dangerous world....
[T]he [Pentagon’s] procurement system is not just failing to
partner with industry. Often, it is downright hostile to us….
We are in danger of being swept over by a rising, increasingly
expensive and exhausting wave of regulations and disclosure
requirements unrelated to our mission.

Linda Hudson, Feature Comment: The Perfect Storm for Defense, 55 GC ¶
119. We wish that more business executives would be as frank and clear.
See also, Loren Thompson, Five Reasons Defense Companies Need to Start
Getting Out of Defense, Forbes (Sept. 23, 2013) (discussing changes in
threats, politics, budgets, economics, and opinions), available at http://
www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2013/09/23/five-reasons-defensecompanies-need-to-start-getting-out-of-defense/. And, of course, the House
Armed Services Committee recently launched “a long-term effort to reform
the Department of Defense including a hard look at acquisition” with two
October hearings. See, e.g., http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/
durable-defense-reform.
IV. THE ACQUISITION WORKFORCE: ANOTHER LOST YEAR
There is little point in lamenting the derailing of any serious effort to
restock the depleted and graying acquisition workforce. Moreover, in 2013,
rather than commit additional funds or energy to training, this year’s focus
was on reducing duplicative (or, arguably, increasing efficiency) expenditures on training. See generally, Joseph G. Jordan, Memorandum for Chief
Acquisition Officers and Senior Procurement Executives, Increasing Efficiencies in the Training, Development, and Management of the Acquisition
Workforce (Sept. 3, 2013) (tasking the Federal Acquisition Institute (FAI)
to lead acquisition workforce initiatives that will: (1) reduce duplication
of workforce management information systems, and (2) leverage scarce
training resources across agencies), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/sites/default/files/omb/procurement/memo/increasing-efficienciesin-the-training-development-and-management-of-the-acquisition-workforce.pdf. See also, IGs Challenged to Maintain Budgets, Retain Skilled
Workforce, Survey Shows, 55 GC ¶ 296; State Has Not Accomplished Key
Goals of Procurement Services, 55 GC ¶ 190 (a significant chunk of the onepercent fee subsidized other activities that operated at a loss rather than
the three acquisition-related goals: performance measurement, customer
service, and continuous improvement); As DOD Workforce Shrinks, Effort
to Determine Appropriate Mix Lags, GAO Reports, 55 GC ¶ 182 (which,
among other things, pounds the drum for more data on contractor FTE’s);
Tricare Acquisition Workforce Needs Better Oversight, DOD IG Says, 55
GC ¶ 146; Agencies Have Limited Insight Into Costs, Benefits of Acquisition Workforce Training, 55 GC ¶ 127, www.gao.gov/assets/660/653437.
© 2014 Thomson Reuters
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pdfwww.gao.gov/assets/660/653437.pdf (“The shortage of trained acquisition personnel hinders agencies from managing and overseeing acquisition programs and contracts that have become more expensive and
increasingly complex[.]” Nonetheless, “[12] of the 23 agencies ‘did not have
insight into whether their acquisition workforce training investment is
improving individual skills or agency performance,’ including seven that
did not have any metrics.”); DOT Can Improve Acquisition Workforce Data
Collection, Management, 55 GC ¶ 31; Acquisition Workforce in “Unabated
Crisis,” Survey Says, 55 GC ¶ 5. It is difficult to be optimistic about major
investment in the acquisition workforce in light of the current economic
realities. But we join those who identify inadequacy of the government’s
approach to investing in its acquisition workforce:
It is time to fundamentally rethink and revise current
human capital strategies, including planning, development,
performance management, and, in some cases, structures. It
must be recognized that whatever has been done for the last two
decades simply is not delivering the desired results, and futurefocused human capital initiatives must not be based on present
or past presumptions. …
Collaboration must become a central component of government
operations, internally and externally. … [A]ll participants,
inside and outside of government, must be working toward and
evaluated against a set of common performance and mission
measures.

Professional Services Council, Report of the 2013 PSC Leadership Commission, From Crisis to Opportunity Creating a New Era of Government
Efficiency, Innovation and Performance (2013), available at http://www.
pscouncil.org/c/p/2013_Commission_Report/The_2013_PSC_Leadership_Commission_Report.aspx.
V.

CYBERSECURITY: THE EVOLVING WILD CARD

In November, after a lengthy process, DOD promulgated the new
cybersecurity rule. See 78 Fed. Reg. 69273 (Nov. 18, 2013) (“This final
rule addresses safeguarding requirements that cover only unclassified
controlled technical information and reporting the compromise of unclassified controlled technical information.”). See, e.g., Andy Irwin et al., Feature
Comment: DOD Amends DFARS To Bolster Cybersecurity of Unclassified
Contractor Systems, Answering Some Questions and Raising Others, 55
GC ¶ 383:
Contractors “subject to the final rule (as implemented by a
contract clause) will have to observe three requirements: (1)
adopting and implementing certain NIST IT security standards;
(2) mandatory reporting of cybersecurity incidents to DOD; and
(3) flowing these requirements to subcontractors, and perhaps
reporting a subcontractor’s cyber incidents to DOD….
The rule … requires contractors that enter into a Government
contract containing the new cybersecurity clause to implement

9-11

© 2014 Thomson Reuters

NOTES
certain NIST information systems security procedures in their
project, enterprise or company-wide unclassified IT system. … [T]
he standards specified by the rule cover 14 areas of information
security … [including] access control, awareness and training,
accountability, configuration management, contingency planning,
identification and authentication, incident response, maintenance,
media protection, physical and environmental protection, program
management, risk assessment, system and communications
protection, and system and information integrity....
[T]he new rule also contains a reporting requirement.
Contractors subject to the rule must report within 72 hours to
DOD, via an internet portal, if there is a cyber incident that
affects covered controlled technical information. The exact scope
of this reporting requirement is not clear….

See also, Brian E. Finch & Justin A. Chiarodo, Feature Comment: 10 Things
Government Contractors Should Know About Cybersecurity Compliance,
55 GC ¶ 364, which provide a helpful outline rubric:
1. Cyber threats are as great as ever. ... The Defense Science
Board recently documented a number of breached systems,
and the list is breathtaking…. The Edward Snowden/National
Security Agency scandal is perhaps the best example…. [T]hese
attacks show no signs of slowing down, and, in fact, they are
likely to get worse…. Government contractors are particularly
vulnerable in this environment, given the types of information
they have access to and maintain.
2. The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002
(FISMA), 44 USCA § 3544, remains the key statute underlying
federal cybersecurity regulations for Government contractors.
3. FISMA is only one of many laws that impact cybersecurity
compliance…. A June 2013 report by the Congressional
Research Service identified more than 50 statutes addressing …
cybersecurity, either directly or indirectly, and more legislation
in the pipeline. See “Federal Laws Relating to Cybersecurity:
Overview and Discussion of Proposed Revisions” (CRS 7-5700)….
4. Efforts to standardize approaches in federal procurement
remain works in progress.
5. What remains for contractors is a piecemeal approach.
6. Read your solicitations and contracts. … Government
contractors should carefully review solicitations on which they
bid and contracts that they are awarded.
7. Know that fingers will likely point to you when it comes to
accountability.
8. Be mindful of the risks. … [Among other things,] ensure that
regulatory requirements are properly included and that risk
© 2014 Thomson Reuters
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and indemnity issues related to cybersecurity are appropriately
addressed[.]
9. Consider risk transfer…. [C]ontractors should plan as though
cybersecurity will be at their expense….
10. Develop – and review – your cybersecurity plan. … [F]ormalize
and centralize cybersecurity oversight, with a plan addressing
regulatory compliance, crisis management, investigations,
reporting, risk assessment, technology, contract management
and public relations….

See also, East Asia Accounts for Half of Unauthorized Attempts to Access
Classified Technologies, DSS Reports, 55 GC ¶ 234; ABA Section Recommends Flexible Cybersecurity Contracting Standards, 55 GC ¶ 210; David
Z. Bodenheimer & Elliott R. Golding, Feature Comment: Regulating Cybersecurity On a Piecemeal Basis—Can the Executive Order Harmonize the
Cyber Law Patchwork?, 55 GC ¶ 198; Industry Group Suggests Consistent
Approach in Developing Cybersecurity Measures, 55 GC ¶ 124; Mary Beth
Bosco & Norma Krayem, Feature Comment: Cybersecurity 101 For Government Contractors, 55 GC ¶ 100.
VI. NOW IS THE WINTER OF OUR DISCONTENT: LESS
SPENDING, MORE CRITIQUE AND CRITICISM (AND
ALAS, PLENTIFUL FUEL FOR THE FIRE)
Granted, it’s no wonder that government procurement, contractors, or
doing business with the government failed to gain ground in the court of
public opinion last year.
• Allegations and finger-pointing highlight contractor involvement in the poorly managed implementation of the Affordable Care Act
regime. See, e.g., Jerry Markon & Alice Crites, HealthCare.gov contract:
Politics not a factor, but neither were firm’s ties to failed projects, Wash.
Post (Dec. 22, 2013)(“CGI Federal … won the job because of what federal
officials deemed a ‘technically superior’ proposal.... [But n]ot considered
in the 2011 selection process was the history of numerous executives …,
who had come from another company that had mishandled at least 20
other government information technology projects more than a decade
ago.”), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/healthcaregov-contract-politics-not-a-factor-but-neither-were-firms-ties-to-failedprojects/2013/12/22/61728fca-6753-11e3-a0b9-249bbb34602c_story.
html?hpid=z1; Lydia Depillis, Meet CGI Federal, the company behind
the botched launch of HealthCare.gov, Wonkblog (Oct. 16, 2013)(“CGI
Federal is a relative newbie on the U.S. government IT contracting
scene. It bought … American Management Systems in 2004, but only
started ramping up business after 2008, and accelerated in 2010 with
the $1.1 billion acquisition of … IT contractor Stanley Inc.”), available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/10/16/
meet-cgi-federal-the-company-behind-the-botched-launch-of-healthcaregov/. See also, Robert Pear Sharon, From the Start, Signs of Trouble at
Health Portal, NY Times (Oct. 12, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/10/13/us/politics/from-the-start-signs-of-trouble-at-health-
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portal.html?pagewanted=all&smid=tw-share&_r=1, noting, among other
things:
[T]he government was so slow in issuing specifications that the
firm did not start writing software code until this spring…. As
late as the last week of September, officials were still changing
features of the Web site … and debating whether consumers
should be required to register and create password-protected
accounts before they could shop for health plans. … One highly
unusual decision… proved critical: the Medicare and Medicaid
agency assumed the role of project quarterback, responsible for
making sure each separately designed database and piece of
software worked with the others, instead of assigning that task
to a lead contractor. Some people … seriously doubted that the
agency had the in-house capability to handle such a mammoth
technical task of software engineering while simultaneously
supervising 55 contractors. An internal … progress report …
identified a lack of employees ‘to manage the multiple activities
and contractors happening concurrently’ as a ‘major risk’ to the
whole project.

• Bubbling beneath the surface of the story involving 2013’s dramatic
security breach is the issue of limiting or better controlling contractor
access to classified information. Tracy Connor, Growth of intel outsourcing no secret, but now Congress taking notice, NBC News (June 15, 2013)
(“A growing chorus on Capitol Hill is questioning whether U.S. intelligence agencies are farming out too much work to private contractors
like Edward Snowden, the Booz Allen Hamilton systems analyst who has
claimed credit leaking classified details about surveillance programs.”),
available at http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/15/18940842growth-of-intel-outsourcing-no-secret-but-now-congress-taking-notice?lite.
; Jordan Weissmann, Edward Snowden: Exhibit A for How Washington
Blows Money on Contractors, Atlantic (June 10, 2013) (“maybe Snowden
really was just worth his $200,000 salary – he did have a security clearance ... and had worked for the CIA and for Dell as an NSA contractor. Or
maybe the government contracting just lends itself to absurd payscales.”),
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/06/
edward-snowden-exhibit-a-for-how-washington-blows-money-on-contractors/276714/; Robert O’Harrow Jr.,The outsourcing of U.S. intelligence
raises risks among the benefits, Wash. Post (June 9, 2013) (“Edward
Snowden, the 29-year-old ... source ... has worked at Booz Allen Hamilton and other intelligence contractors. Before entering the private
sector, he says he held a series of technical jobs at the Central Intelligence Agency.”), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/the-outsourcing-of-us-intelligence-raises-risks-amongthe-benefits/2013/06/09/eba2d314-d14c-11e2-9f1a-1a7cdee20287_story.
html?hpid=z1. On a related note, see Sean Reilly, Background check
contractor at risk of suspension, experts say: USIS faces fraud claims in
lawsuit, Federal Times (Nov. 3, 2013) (discussing False Claims Act lawsuit
filed against USIS, which “performs almost two-thirds of the background
checks for security clearances that are extended to millions of federal
employees and contractors…. The … [relator] alleges that USIS system© 2014 Thomson Reuters
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atically submitted background investigations … that were incomplete or
not properly reviewed….”), available at http://www.federaltimes.com/
article/20131103/PERSONNEL01/311030001/Background-checkcontractor-risk-suspension-experts-say.
• Only in a busy year like 2013, could “Fat Leonard,” Glenn Marine,
and the Navy’s sensational contracting scandal rank third (at best) in
terms of media interest. Christoper Drew & Danielle Ivory, In Navy Billing Scandal, a Third Company Puts an Executive on Leave, NY Times (Dec.
19, 2013) (“Multinational Logistic Services, known as MLS, is the Navy’s
largest ship supply company, with $346 million in contracts for ports in
Africa, the Mediterranean, Central America and the Pacific.”) available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/20/us/in-navy-billing-scandala-third-company-puts-an-executive-on-leave.html?smid=fb-share&_r=0;
Christoper Drew & Danielle Ivory, Navy Was Warned of Contractor at
Center of Bribery Inquiry, NY Times (Nov. 20, 2013) (“Emails obtained by
criminal investigators show that from 2009 to early 2011, several ship
crews and contracting officials filed complaints about … ‘gold-plated’
fees for fuel, port security and other services.”) available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/11/21/us/navy-was-warned-of-contractor-inbribery-scandal.html; Craig Whitlock, Two admirals face probe in Navy
bribery scheme, Wash. Post (Nov. 8, 2013) (“Vice Adm. Ted ‘Twig’ Branch,
the service’s top intelligence officer, and Rear Adm. Bruce F. Loveless, the
Navy’s director of intelligence operations, were placed on leave … and
their access to classified material was suspended[.]”), available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/two-admirals-faceprobe-in-navy-bribery-scheme/2013/11/08/d2dc063a-48d8-11e3-bf0ccebf37c6f484_story.html; Craig Whitlock, Senior officer, NCIS agent
are among those arrested in Navy bribery scandal, Wash. Post (Oct.
19, 2013) (Glen Marine “targeted Navy personnel serving in Asia and
plied them with prostitutes, cash, luxury hotel rooms, plane tickets and
... tickets to a Lady Gaga concert in Thailand.”), available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/senior-officer-ncisagent-are-among-those-arrested-in-navy-bribery-scandal/2013/10/19/
e9a1e9b6-3753-11e3-bda2-e637e3241dc8_story.html. See also, Inchcape
Shipping Services Holding, Ltd., B-402687.10, B-402687.11 (Dec 9, 2013)
(protest of post-suspension reprocurements), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/659645.pdf.
• We are somewhat fatigued by the ever-increasing Congressional
drumbeat demanding automatic suspension and debarment of contractors or, in the alternative, a government-wide commitment to refusing to
do business with a larger slice of the private sector. The clear message
from Congress is that it wants more heads to roll – scalp counting matters! – and, that cannot be good news for contractors or government customers in the long term. Industry, Watchdog Groups Take Opposing Tack
on Proposed SUSPEND Act, 55 GC ¶ 358; House Oversight Committee
Passes Suspension and Debarment Overhaul, 55 GC ¶ 351; Todd Canni
& Jason Carey, Feature Comment: Contractors Beware – COFC Endorses
Clandestine Debarment System, 55 GC ¶ 251; Persistent S&D Weaknesses
Remain, Witnesses Tell Committee, 55 GC ¶ 188; House Oversight Chair
Ponders Centralizing Suspension and Debarment Functions, 55 GC ¶ 54.
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• Lenny Bernstein, Workers turned EPA warehouse in Landover
into personal rec rooms, audit finds, Wash. Post (June 5, 2013), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/
workers-turned-epa-warehouse-in-landover-into-personal-rec-rooms-auditfinds/2013/06/05/ed5514fc-ce17-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html.
“In [a Landover EPA warehouse, employees of Apex Logistics] … created
personal rec rooms with televisions, radios, chairs and couches … photos,
calendars and pinups … books, magazines and videos … a refrigerator and
… a microwave … [and] a 30-by-45-foot athletic center, cobbled together
from ‘surplus’ EPA gym equipment and … a music system provided via
‘other agency inventory items….’”
• Department of Justice, Press Release, Security Contractors Plead
Guilty in Virginia to Illegally Obtaining $31 Million from Contracts Intended for Disadvantaged Small Businesses, (Mar 18, 2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/March/13-crm-323.html. Among
other things:
Hedman admitted that in 2003 he created a shell company…
to ensure he could continue to gain access to 8(a) contracting
preferences…. Hedman selected an employee, Dawn Hamilton
… to serve as a figurehead owner based on her Portuguese
heritage and history of social disadvantage, when in reality the
new company would be managed by Hedman…. [T]hey falsely
claimed that Hamilton formed and founded the company and
that she was the only member of the company’s management.
They continued to mislead the SBA through 2012, even lying
to the SBA to overcome a protest filed by another company
accusing Hedman’s former company and the shell company of
being inappropriately affiliated.

• Stephanie Mencimer, The War of Rape: What happened to Jamie
Leigh Jones in Iraq?, Washington Monthly (November/December 2013),
available at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/november_
december_2013/features/the_war_of_rape047355.php?page=all. In 2007,
Jamie Leigh Jones appeared on television and before Congress detailing
how, as an inexperienced 20-year-old, she had been raped in the Green
Zone while working as a Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR) contractor. After
a lengthy trial, the jury awarded her no damages against KBR, and the
judge subsequently ordered Jones to pay KBR $145,000 for its legal costs.
Among other things, the author details that Jones: (1) had an extensive
history of depression, hypochondria, and/or psychosomatic symptoms; and
(2) that, at “Camp Hope Army hospital in 2005, it was the fourth time in
five years that she had told a medical professional that she’d been raped[.]”
The author bemoans that: “The media, which had played such a major
role in publicizing Jones’s story, all but ignored the grand finale. ... The
verdict represented an epic media failure, and one that could have been
avoided if reporters … had heeded some of the early warning signs....”
• We would be remiss if – unlike the nation’s media sources – we
failed to report that, as of the close of 2013, more than 3,000 contractor
personnel have died supporting the U.S. Government’s efforts in Iraq and
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Afghanistan (and the total exceeds 3,150 once deaths in Kuwait are included). In addition, more than 80,000 contractor personnel have suffered
injuries. Defense Base Act Case Summary by Nation, http://www.dol.
gov/owcp/dlhwc/dbaallnation.htm. See also, Jabeen Bhatti, Interpreters
wait for promise of life in USA, USA Today (Oct. 19, 2013) (“The United
States has long been aware of the danger [interpreters] put themselves
in by helping the Americans. So it created a special visa for them to come
to work and live in the USA once their assignment was up.... [Yet, with
these programs expired (or expiring),] of the 25,000 visas allocated by
law to Iraqis …, fewer than 6,000 have been issued since 2008 ... [and of]
the 8,750 available for Afghans, fewer than 1,200 have been granted.”),
available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/10/19/
afghanistan-iraq-interpreters/2958153/.
• More than two decades of litigation (in the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and the U.S.
Supreme Court), cumulative fatigue, or economic efficiency, appear to
have produced a settlement in the A-12 litigation (originally filed in June
of 1991, following the January 1991 contract termination). Conceptually,
pending Congressional approval, Boeing (formerly McDonnell Douglass)
and General Dynamics each would provide the Navy the equivalent of $198
million in design, production, and delivery costs on existing programs (for
a total of just under $400 million). David Alexander, After two decades,
U.S. Navy near deal to settle ‘Flying Dorito’ suit, Reuters (Aug. 2, 2013),
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/02/usa-defenseflyingdorito-idUSL1N0G31T620130802; Jen DiMascio, Administration
Seeks Authority For U.S. Navy To Receive A-12 Settlement, Aviation Week
(May 21, 2013), available at http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.
aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_05_21_2013_p0-580920.xml.
• David Francis, Pentagon’s Failure to Audit Contracts Wastes Billions, Fiscal Times (May 21, 2013) (“To put the 24,000-case logjam in
context, the agency conducted 7,390 audits in 2011 (the last year data is
available). Using that rate, DCAA would not clear its current backlog until
at least 2016. That’s not counting any new cases that the agency must audit.”), available at: http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2013/05/21/
Pentagons-Failure-to-Audit-Contracts-Wastes-Billions#page1.
Lest we end on an optimistic note, 2013 offered plentiful critique – from
GAO, the Inspectors Generals, and the oversight community – across a
broad range of issues. See also, among others, Commerce Needs to Improve
T&M/LH Contract Award, Administration, 55 GC ¶ 373; Navy Needs Updated Policy to Address Shipbuilding Deficiencies, GAO Says, 55 GC ¶ 375;
IG Questions NASA’s Award-Fee Contract Use, 55 GC ¶ 374; IG Catalogs
SBA’s Most Serious Management Challenges, 55 GC ¶ 359; FPS Contract
Guard Program Oversight Continues to Fall Short, GAO Finds, 55 GC ¶
348; CRS Examines Improper Payment Recovery Efforts, 55 GC ¶ 340;
IG Questions DCAA Audit of Contractor Business System, 55 GC ¶ 339;
VA Needs Better Oversight or Training Conference Spending, IG Reports,
55 GC ¶ 323; DOE IG Finds Poor Financial Management in Alternative
Energy Program, 55 GC ¶ 322; DOD Insourcing Cost Comparison Guidance Does Not Include All Costs, GAO Finds, 55 GC ¶ 314; Postal Service
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Noncompetitive Purchases Lack Documentation, IG Reports, 55 GC ¶ 313;
DARPA Did Not Consistently Follow Requirements for BAA Contracts,
IG Says, 55 GC ¶ 287; National Lab Needs to Improve T&M Subcontract
Market Research, Price Analysis, 55 GC ¶ 262; Army Not Complying With
FAR Cost-Reimbursement Rules, IG Finds, 55 GC ¶ 278; Navy Not Following Software Licensing Best Practices, 55 GC ¶ 260; DOT Still Using
Cost-Reimbursement Contracts Despite FAR Requirements, IG Says, 55
GC ¶ 254; DOT SmartPay Card Controls Not Always Followed, IG Says,
55 GC ¶ 243; DOD Efforts to Improve Service Contracts Lack Assessment
Processes, GAO Reports, 55 GC ¶ 215; IRS Purchase Card Program Needs
Stronger Internal Controls, Tax IG Says, 55 GC ¶ 207; FAS Managers Interfering With COs’ Contract Administration, GSA IG Finds, 55 GC ¶ 179;
DOD Continues to Struggle to Modernize Business Systems, 55 GC ¶ 172;
Commercial Procurement Practices Could Improve Services Contracting
GAO Says, 55 GC ¶ 169; IG Finds IRS Did Not Comply With FAR Revisions
Addressing Cost-Reimbursement Contracts, 55 GC ¶ 155; GAO Finds VA
Construction Delays, Cost Overruns, 55 GC ¶ 153; MDA Acquisition Would
Benefit from Best Practices, GAO Says, 55 GC ¶ 145; Poor EPA Superfund
Site Planning Delayed Toxicity Assessment, 55 GC ¶ 139; NSF Early Acquisition Planning Needs Additional Guidance, GAO Says, 55 GC ¶ 111;
DOD Major IT Acquisitions Fell Short of Targets, GAO Finds, 55 GC ¶
110; DOD Competition Rate Continues to Drop, GAO Finds, 55 GC ¶ 109
(noting a five-year decline from 62.6 to 57.1 percent, and recognizing the
impact of budgetary uncertainty on acquisition planning); IG Finds DOE
Approved Above Market Rate Contractor Executive Salaries, 55 GC ¶ 102;
IG Finds Flaws With Air Force Use, Documentation of Cost-Reimbursable
Contracts, 55 GC ¶ 101; MAS Pre-Award Audits Raise Several Concerns,
GSA IG Reports, 55 GC ¶ 86; Most DCAA FY 2010 Audits in IG’s Sample
Lacked Professional Judgment, 55 GC ¶ 84 (although no effort has been
made by the IGs to quantify any potential impact of DCAA’s shortcomings
on contractors or business transactions); CSB Finds Acquisition Regulations For Fireworks Disposal Fall Short, 55 GC ¶ 77 (demonstrating that
no issue is too arcane to mandate government-wide policy guidance in the
FAR, CSB recommended increased FAR responsibility standards for prospective contractors and subcontractors handling explosive and hazardous
materials); Nonprofits Decry Wasteful Government Programs, 55 GC ¶ 43.
Fortunately, there will plenty for us to discuss in 2014.
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